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1. Introduction 
This research project is the product of a conviction, 
corroborated by the events that have overwhelmed 
the Arab world since December 2010, that 
sustainability is essential to any understanding of 
Mediterranean politics. Sustainability has too often 
been confused with stability in policy debates in 
the region and in the West. Not only are these two 
concepts distinct, with sustainability being broader 
and deeper than stability, but stability, as 
interpreted with regard to the regimes in the 
region, has often run counter to the very conditions 
that underpin state sustainability. Believing and 
thus pursuing regime stability has ultimately acted 
to the detriment of a more organic understanding 
of state sustainability.  
Silvia Colombo’s opening contribution to this 
research explored the conditions for state 
sustainability; a concept that is both 
multidimensional and related to other, equally 
complex, notions such as state legitimacy and 
political capital. Colombo set out the social, 
economic, political and broader contextual 
variables that determine state sustainability. At the 
socio-economic level, she cites equality, social 
bonds, social cooperation, civic engagement, 
empathy and reciprocity vis-à-vis fellow citizens, 
political engagement, income growth, welfare in 
areas such as health, education and consumption, 
poverty levels and economic governance. At the 
political level, the presence of stable and 
functioning institutions is not only of prime 
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importance, but also critical are the quality of 
institutions in terms of transparency and the rule of 
law, and the broader political context of 
democratic rights and civil liberties. Alongside 
these domestic socioeconomic and political 
variables, Colombo points to the external 
dimension, including both the regional and 
international levels. Regionally, of key importance 
is the evolution of conflicts in the area, specifically 
the Western Sahara conflict in the Maghreb and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict in the Mashreq. 
Internationally, the focus, which reflects the 
principal theme of this contribution, is on Western 
and, in particular, EU policies. Specifically, the 
nature and conduct of foreign aid and trade 
policies, as well as democracy promotion and 
conflict resolution policies impinge, often 
crucially, on the prospects of state sustainability in 
the southern Mediterranean.  
With this context in mind, this concluding 
contribution proceeds in two steps. First, it reviews 
from a comparative perspective the results of the 
empirical branch of this research, elaborated in the 
papers by Silvia Colombo, Paolo Napolitano, 
Hakim Darbouche and Maria Cristina Paciello.1 
These chapters delve into the case studies of this 
project – Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Israel-
Palestine, and Syria-Lebanon. As events have 
shown, the selection of these case studies could not 
have been more appropriate. The research, 
fieldwork and writing on these countries were 
carried out immediately prior to, during and after 
the revolts from the autumn of 2010 to the spring 
of 2011. These case studies thus offer a rich gamut 
of material to draw on for a comparative analysis. 
Amongst our sample we have countries that have 
experienced revolutions (Tunisia and Egypt); 
others that, having attempted this route, remain 
embroiled, at the time of writing, in violence and 
authoritarianism (Syria and Libya); others that 
have embarked on a government-managed, top-
down process of reform (Morocco). Others still 
have so far failed to act on their promises of wide-
ranging political reform (Algeria).  
Finally, the research includes countries which 
continue to be enmeshed in old conflicts and will 
be influenced by the historic events in the region in 
far-reaching and unpredictable ways (Israel-
Palestine and Lebanon). 
Having reviewed the comparative implications of 
these cases, this paper turns to the external 
dimension of state sustainability, and in particular 
                                                     
1These papers are available at: http://www.medpro-
foresight.eu/publications-wp2 
the EU’s response to the changing configuration of 
its southern neighbourhood. How has the EU 
responded to the momentous developments 
unfolding along its southern borders, and how 
could it respond so as to tailor its policies towards 
supporting a sustainable southern Mediterranean in 
a 2030 perspective?  
2. State sustainability in the southern 
Mediterranean: comparative insights 
Prior to the Arab revolts, unsustainability was a 
common malaise across the southern 
Mediterranean. It had taken two principal forms. 
On the one hand, the adjustment of authoritarian 
rule to the exigencies of a 21st century globalised 
world (Guazzone & Pioppi, 2009). This entailed 
the pursuit of phoney political reform and an 
economic liberalisation process that failed to spur 
political liberalisation as warranted by 
modernisation theories (Lipset, 1959; Huntington, 
1968), instead entrenching regime capture of the 
economy. On the other hand, the conflict-ridden 
nature of the region hampered the sustainability 
both of the conflicting parties – Morocco, Israel-
Palestine, Syria, Lebanon – and of the broader area 
by impeding meaningful regional and sub-regional 
cooperation, a sine qua non of sustainable 
development.  
External actors, the US and EU in primis, alas, 
perpetuated these elements of unsustainability. 
Such perpetuation became even more pronounced 
after 2005-2006. When, in those years, the 
marginal increase in political openness in some 
Middle Eastern countries produced, through 
electoral processes, unexpected (and undesired by 
the West) outcomes, the West quickly backtracked 
on its commitment to political reform. In 2005, the 
Muslim Brotherhood won a surprising 88 out of 
454 seats in the Egyptian parliament, in what had 
been the most open legislative elections in the 
country. In Lebanon, after the Syrian withdrawal in 
2005, the Lebanese general elections resulted in a 
strong showing for Hezbollah, which successively 
entered the coalition government. Most resounding 
of all, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), 
Hamas, having participated in municipal elections 
in 2004 and 2005 and indicated its willingness to 
enter the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
and accept the Palestinian Authority (PA), 
unexpectedly won the January 2006 legislative 
elections. These Islamist inroads through 
democratic processes triggered the abandonment of 
what had been a rather superficial and ill-thought-
out embrace of democracy by the West in the post-
9/11 world, reverting to a more comfortable notion 
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of cooperation with authoritarian (but pro-
Western) regimes.  
This abandonment had immediate repercussions on 
EU policy towards the region. Almost 
diametrically opposed to the logic underpinning 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which, 
at least in theory, was committed to the promotion 
of a “well governed ring of friends” in the EU’s 
neighbourhood, in 2007, French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy launched his idea of a Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) with much fanfare (Bicchi & 
Gillespie, 2011). The underlying logic of the UfM 
was one of compartmentalising Euro-Med 
relations, by sidelining political questions and 
proceeding unabated with economic cooperation 
through the promotion of specific projects. Also 
sidelined was the EU’s attention both to the 
conflicts in the region – namely, the Arab-Israeli 
and Western Sahara conflicts – and also 
democracy and human rights issues within the 
southern partners. In contrast to the logic of the 
ENP, which at least in theory is premised on 
conditional cooperation determined by the 
domestic reform credentials of the neighbours, the 
UfM promoted commercially sponsored 
cooperation between the two shores of the 
Mediterranean, irrespective of political 
developments. High up on the UfM’s list of 
priority projects were energy, infrastructure, 
transport, environment, research and SME 
development. This is not the place to review the 
content, desirability and viability of these projects, 
many of which are yet to see the light of day. 
Suffice it to say here that the logic of these projects 
and of the UfM as a whole was that of promoting 
cooperation between the two shores of the 
Mediterranean, without questioning the political 
context in which such cooperation was embedded.  
The initiative was initially met with scepticism 
both within and outside the EU. Central and 
northern member states, first and foremost 
Germany, as well as the Commission, protested 
against the intergovernmentalisation of EU policy 
that the UfM entailed, shifting EU decision-
making to the southern Mediterranean coastal 
states. Southern member states, notably Spain and 
Italy, were equally concerned, fearing French 
designs to supplant their leadership role in the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Outside 
the EU, Ankara shunned Sarkozy’s attempt to 
relegate Turkey to the Mediterranean – rather than 
European – Union. Israel also had little sympathy 
for what appeared to be a re-multilateralisation of 
Euro-Med policies. And the Arab world watched 
with caution an initiative that purportedly aimed to 
transform the much-celebrated “joint ownership” 
of Euro-Med policies from rhetoric to reality, but 
which in practice smacked of an all-French affair.  
Interestingly however, no strong lobby emerged 
against the UfM’s sidelining of the political reform 
agenda, either within or outside the EU. Despite all 
the grumblings, the UfM ultimately came into 
being in the summer of 2008, oddly merging with 
the EMP and giving rise to the unwieldy UfM-
EMP (Aliboni & Ammor, 2009). Since then, 
commitment has faltered all round and the UfM 
has struggled to resolve its institutional problems. 
Above all, securing the private sector funds needed 
to realise its ambitious projects has proved an 
uphill battle. Its six priority projects – de-pollution 
of the Mediterranean, maritime and land highways, 
civil protection, alternative energy and the 
Mediterranean Solar Plan, higher education and 
research, and SME support – remain more in the 
domain of ambition than reality. What the UfM did 
succeed in doing, however, was placing on the 
backburner EU aims to spur the domestic 
transformation of its southern Mediterranean 
partners. Epitomising this “success” was the fact 
that heralded as co-chair of the UfM, alongside 
French President Sarkozy, was none other than his 
Egyptian counterpart Hosni Mubarak, certainly no 
shining example of a Mediterranean reformer.  
Then came the revolts, which proved that the 
stability of these regimes was a mere chimera. 
Since early 2011, a tide of change has swept across 
North Africa and the Middle East. Before the eyes 
of the world, watching with a quixotic mix of awe 
and concern, the so-called Arab street, often 
derided for its apathy and acquiescence, 
nonetheless succeeded where no one else had (or 
perhaps tried) in just over a month. Through mass 
protests (and tacit military support), longstanding 
dictators the likes of Tunisian President Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali and Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak melted away like giants with feet of clay. 
As their regimes crumbled, shockwaves were felt 
from Morocco to Yemen, and empowered 
populations rose in jubilation and despair.  
A comparative reflection of state sustainability in 
the southern Mediterranean in this new context 
begins by pointing out how the revolts are likely to 
lead to a far more heterogeneous and fragmented 
region than the one we once (thought we) knew. 
This brings us to reflect on one of the scenarios 
delineated in Colombo’s opening contribution: that 
of an increasingly polarised Mediterranean. In this 
scenario, the southern Mediterranean is marked by 
divergence, entailing both the situation of a single 
– or a group of – countries and the aggregate 
developments in the Euro-Mediterranean region. 
Polarisation means that, if certain conditions are 
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fulfilled, some countries will move towards a 
sustainable future, while others will either remain 
in or accelerate dynamics towards unsustanability, 
instability and/or conflict. The Arab revolts seem, 
for the time being, to corroborate this scenario. 
Polarisation can mark differences between sub-
regions of the Mediterranean (e.g., the Maghreb 
moving towards sustainability and the Mashreq 
and Gulf towards conflict and unsustainability), as 
well as within them (e.g. within the Maghreb, 
Morocco and Tunisia moving towards 
sustainability and Libya and Algeria towards 
unsustainability).  
See table in Annex 1.  
We may be moving towards a situation in which a 
country like Tunisia, despite the manifold and 
persisting political, economic and social challenges 
spelled out by Paciello, holds the promise of 
moving decidedly away from authoritarianism and 
towards democracy. The problems remain 
daunting, and relate to the uncertain transition 
steps of the interim government, the fragile 
security situation, the mounting socio-economic 
problems, the evolution and consolidation of 
political and civil society actors, including the 
Islamist al-Nahda, and the absence of a strong and 
credible external anchor (i.e., the EU). Yet far 
more than any other southern Mediterranean 
country, Tunisia offers a realistic hope that the 
future, at the very least, will not see a return to Ben 
Ali-styled authoritarianism and, at most, will move 
towards a veritable democracy. Sustainable 
development is no certainty in Tunisia. But neither 
is it a naïve pipedream.   
With all its caveats, the optimism regarding 
Tunisia seems less warranted in Egypt. Like the 
Jasmine revolution in Tunisia, the Tahrir 
equivalent in Egypt succeeded in overthrowing a 
decades-long dictator. This success should not be 
underestimated. Similar challenges to the ones 
faced by Tunisia face post-Mubarak Egypt. As 
Paciello notes, Egypt has to grapple with public 
insecurity, an uncertain evolution of civil and 
political actors, including the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and mounting socio-economic problems. But 
unlike Tunisia, Egypt faces additional challenges. 
As much as a popular revolution, Egypt underwent 
a military coup (Springborg, 2011). Unlike in 
Tunisia, where the small military2 enjoyed few 
organic political links, the Egyptian military is a 
large and integral element of the regime itself. The 
armed forces in Egypt boast significant political 
                                                     
2 With its 48,000 troops, the Tunisian army is the 
smallest in the Arab world.  
leverage and considerable economic power. As the 
Tahrir revolt gathered pace, the Egyptian military 
recognised that defending the former president was 
a losing battle not worth fighting for at the cost of 
losing popular legitimacy. Following this 
recognition, it opted to steer the political course of 
the country away from its set path of succession 
from Hosni Mubarak to his son Gamal, a path 
which it had never fully espoused. The military 
today retains the reins of power, governing Egypt 
through the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, 
which determines the shape and pace of reforms. 
Despite having protected the revolution (by not 
firing on protesters), it is no driver of a radical 
overturning of the regime of which it is part. The 
resumption of youth demonstrations in June 2011 
has been precisely a reaction to the military’s 
reluctance to proceed with wide-ranging reform. 
Furthermore, this bastion of the old regime has 
found a new modus vivendi with the remnants of 
the former ruling National Democratic Party 
(NDP) as well as the Muslim Brotherhood; a 
situation inconceivable in Tunisia where the 
Islamist al-Nahda is still the antithesis of a 
legitimate political actor in the eyes of the ancien 
regime (and others). In the Egyptian case, the 
military, the Brotherhood and the NDP (and its 
eventual reincarnations) represent a formidable 
political and economic force against a radical 
overturning of the old regime. Alongside this, the 
foreign policies of Western actors are likely to 
remain far more securitised towards Egypt than 
Tunisia, insofar as the former is far more 
enmeshed in Middle Eastern dynamics than the 
latter.3 Hence, in Egypt the risk is that of a 
restructuring of authoritarian rule without a 
veritable turn towards democracy. The jury is out 
as to whether the country will continue to fester in 
unsustainability, stumble into a bon usage du néo-
authoritarisme, or move towards sustainable 
development.  
The case of Libya represents some significant 
differences from those of Tunisia and Egypt. What 
started as an indigenous uprising fuelled by similar 
socio-economic grievances to those in Tunisia and 
Egypt soon spiralled into full-blown civil war, the 
outcome of which was only decided after the 
military intervention of NATO on the side of the 
opposition. The capture and subsequent killing of 
Gaddafi by opposition forces in October 2011 
signalled the end of what may be described as the 
first phase of the Libyan ‘revolution’ but the 
                                                     
3 In the case of Tunisia, it is above all European 
migration policies that are likely to remain security 
focused.  
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subsequent political uncertainty and the emerging 
divisions between the internationally backed 
National Transition Council (NTC) and the 
military commanders on the ground may be a 
recipe for future instability if the current infighting 
continues. Elections for a General National 
Congress, which will be tasked with naming a new 
interim government, are due to be held in June 
2012 and this government is expected to hold 
power until a constitution is drawn up and general 
elections can be called in mid-2013. The mounting 
challenges facing the present government include 
disarming the various militias and integrating them 
into a unified police force and army; restoring 
security and international confidence in Libya’s 
transition; securing Libya’s borders; and 
promoting a truly broad-based, transparent and 
inclusive national dialogue, which respects the 
rights of women and minorities, and is capable of 
enhancing public confidence in the transition 
authorities. The Libyan conflict may be described 
as over but the task of building national institutions 
that can foster an inclusive national identity and 
avoid the emergence of secessionist movements, 
especially in the east, represents stark challenges 
for the interim government.  
While the resurgence of a Gaddafi-like personality 
cult appears unthinkable, a return to centralised 
forms of authoritarianism in Libya cannot be 
discounted out of hand. Due to the legacy left by 
42 years of Gaddafi rule, during which time any 
form of political and/or organisational activity was 
systematically quashed by the regime, transition 
authorities in post-Qaddafi Libya are faced with a 
more daunting task than that of their neighbours to 
the east and west. The task of creating a modern 
legal system is but one example of challenges 
faced by the interim authorities. While on the one 
hand Libya’s extensive oil and gas reserves could 
supply the funds for massive infrastructure projects 
and nation-building exercises, on the other the 
presence of these resources could fuel further 
infighting and regional grievances, as various 
parties compete to gain a dominant position in the 
redistribution of wealth. At the time of writing a 
deepening sense of uncertainty prevails over what 
direction the Libyan transition might take. While 
the prospects of renewed widespread conflict 
appear unlikely, mounting internal and external 
challenges make a transition to democracy and 
sustainable development in Libya look like a long 
and arduous process with, as of yet, no clear end 
result in sight. 
While not having experienced a revolution, the 
same, albeit more limited, uncertainty besets 
Morocco. In Morocco, civil unrest and the fear of a 
domino effect across North Africa has led King 
Muhammed VI to appreciate the difference 
between stability and sustainability. Unlike fellow 
rulers in the region, the King had made greater 
efforts to pursue a bon usage du néo-
authoritarisme, which had projected domestic 
stability and a positive image of the country in the 
West. His rule had centred on the promotion of 
economic modernisation and a few tentative steps 
towards political liberalisation, with reforms 
related to family law and the partial opening of the 
political space to opposition parties being notable 
cases in point. This, alongside the status and 
popular legitimacy of the king himself, had 
highlighted the stability of the regime while 
concealing its underlying features of 
unsustainability. The latter has nonetheless come 
to the fore in light of the Arab spring. 
Demonstrations in Morocco, while not of the 
magnitude seen in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya or Syria, 
have taken and continue to take place. The king 
responded in June 2011 by proposing a referendum 
on a constitutional reform that would somewhat 
reduce the monarchy’s power. The referendum was 
approved by the public in June 2011. It remains to 
be seen whether the reform and its implementation 
will suffice to save Muhammed VI from the fate of 
his fellow rulers farther east. As Colombo notes, 
the greatest challenge for the king is to introduce 
genuine changes in the balance of power, gradually 
transforming the monarchy into a constitutional 
one of the likes of the UK and Spain, and 
proceeding with decentralisation, as well as to 
pursue the reform of the justice and of the 
education systems. Alongside these political 
reforms, economic reforms will need to exert far 
greater effort in combating unemployment, rising 
food prices and endemic poverty. If the Moroccan 
regime engages in these reforms, argues Colombo, 
there are good chances that it will avoid reaching 
the tipping point of no return that has already been 
reached in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and 
Yemen. The end point would thus be a gradual 
transition from a bon usage du néo-authoritarisme 
towards a more genuine system of sustainable 
development.  
Turning to the case of Algeria, the only country in 
North Africa not to have experienced sustained 
anti-government protests, it may appear as though 
the government of Adbulaziz Bouteflika has 
weathered the storm and succeeded in projecting 
an image of stability to the outside world. While 
highlighting the significant historical, economic 
and political differences setting the Algerian case 
apart from that of its North African neighbours, 
Darbouche has nevertheless demonstrated how 
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Algeria has been in a state of ‘stable instability’ 
since the mid-1990s. While Algeria does share 
many of the same socio-economic challenges that 
led to the outbreak of popular protests in other 
countries in the region, the government has been 
able to draw on Algeria’s extensive monetary 
reserves derived from the export of hydrocarbons 
to approve a series of economic measures that have 
succeeded in placating the growing wave of 
popular discontent – at least for now. Following 
the outbreak of protests in Tunisia, many had 
expected Algeria, a country with a long history of 
popular anti-government protests dating back to 
the late 1980s, to be next in line. And Algeria did 
in fact experience a wave of popular anger in early 
January 2011. These protests, however, never 
coalesced into a unified movement calling for the 
downfall of President Bouteflika. Expressions of 
popular grievances remained largely devoid of 
political demands and were essentially localised in 
nature and scope.  
Algeria cannot, however, be said to be immune to 
the changes occurring in the region and the 
government has demonstrated, at least rhetorically, 
an acceptance of the need for reforms in the social, 
political and economic spheres. In February 2012 
the country’s emergency laws, which had been in 
place since a military coup interrupted Algeria’s 
experiment with democratic multi-party elections 
in 1992, were lifted and subsequently the 
government announced a $25 billion increase in 
public spending for 2011. It was not until April 
that President Bouteflika made his first televised 
speech to the nation, in which he promised a period 
of high-level consultations that would lead, by the 
second half of 2012, to a series of constitutional 
and political reforms.  
At the time of writing there appears to be little trust 
in this process and many civil society and 
opposition figures have preferred to boycott the 
consultations altogether. Darbouche points to this 
lack of inclusion as a major shortfall in the 
government’s promises of political reform, while 
highlighting the gradual breakdown of state-
society relations, a persistent popular 
disillusionment with the political process, and a 
growing uncertainty as to who will succeed 
Algeria’s ailing president as possible indicators of 
future instability. If Algeria is to be set on a path of 
sustainable development the country’s interrupted 
process of democratic transition must be resumed 
in full with an aim to consolidate the rule of law, 
popular enfranchisement and total civilian control 
over the military and government.4 A further 
aspect that could tarnish the government’s 
professed image of stability is Algeria’s failure to 
diversify its economy, which today remains 
heavily dependent on the export of hydrocarbons, a 
factor that could result in future instability in the 
event of a prolonged fall in oil prices.    
When it comes to Syria-Lebanon and Israel-
Palestine, the current path of unsustainable 
development, as pointed out by Colombo and 
Napolitano, respectively, risks deepening in view 
of the Arab spring. In Syria, President Bashar al-
Assad attempted, far less successfully than 
Muhammed VI in Morocco, Ben Ali in Tunisia 
and Mubarak in Egypt, the route of economic 
modernisation without political liberalisation. The 
grave economic situation, coupled with precious 
little sign of any political opening, attested to the 
unsustainability of the Syrian state. Yet the Syrian 
regime had a residue of popular legitimacy not 
enjoyed by fellow autocrats in the region, which 
was derived from its foreign policy and in 
particular, its ‘resistance to Israel and the West. 
The revolts in Syria have shown, however, both 
that the actual value of this source of popular 
legitimacy was artificially inflated and/or that the 
regime failed to capitalise on it by proceeding 
genuinely and speedily on the path of reform 
before the tipping point of instability had been 
reached. At the time of writing, the future of Syria 
remains uncertain, but a return to the status quo 
ante seems unlikely. Whether the country will 
remain enmeshed in political violence, which risks 
acquiring a sectarian character, questioning or 
perhaps even breaking the fragile equilibrium in 
Lebanon, or whether it will embark on a path 
towards sustainable development will depend as 
much on internal dynamics as on the role of 
regional (e.g., Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia) and 
international (the US, EU, Russia and China) 
actors. 
Finally, in Israel-Palestine, Napolitano elaborated 
on how weak stability, which has entailed the 
achievement of a sterile political stability, able to 
sustain the status quo but not to confront the main 
challenges for the future of the country(ies), has 
marked both Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
(PA). The Arab spring has rendered the 
unsustainability of this status quo all the more 
evident. In a last ditch attempt to react, the PA, 
discredited by the publication of the Palestine 
                                                     
4 Hakim Darbouche, “Algeria’s Failed Transition to a 
Sustainable Polity; Coming to yet another crossroads”, 
MEDPRO Technical Report No.7, October 2011.  
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papers in January 2011, aware of the imperative to 
respond to Palestinian aspirations against the 
backdrop of democratic revolts in the region, and 
acknowledging the failure of over twenty years of 
the Middle East Peace Process, has opted to pursue 
the path of UN recognition of its statehood. At the 
time of writing in July 2011, the outcome of the 
September 2011 showdown at the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) is unclear. Whether there will 
be a UNGA resolution recognising the Palestinian 
state, what the wording of the resolution will be, 
and by which UN members it will be supported, is 
unknown. Equally unknown is how Israel will 
react and what the substantive implications for the 
Middle East conflict will be. Looking forward 
however, one could posit that whereas a 
recognition of a Palestinian state will not alter the 
conflict dynamics on the ground and may even 
widen the gap separating the international 
diplomatic talk of a two-state solution and the 
unfeasibility of such a solution on the ground, it 
may open an interesting path of ‘non-violent 
unilateralism’. Since the early 1990s, in fact, the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict has oscillated between 
non-violent bilateralism (i.e., negotiations) and 
aggressive unilateralism (i.e., the Palestinian 
intifada, Israeli military incursions, settlement 
construction, construction of the separation barrier, 
etc.). Aggressive unilateralism has taken the upper 
hand as and when bilateral negotiations stalled. 
Today those negotiations hold no promise of 
delivering a two-state solution, a reality all too 
evident to Israelis and Palestinians alike (albeit less 
so by the international community). In this context, 
embarking on an alternative path of peaceful 
unilateralism through the UN and the ensuing steps 
that may follow may represent the only way out of 
the periodical relapse into violence.  
In conclusion, the future of the Mediterranean 
region may well display features of all the 
scenarios outlined by Colombo. The overarching 
framework would be one of an increasingly 
polarised region. Within this scenario, we may see 
some countries tentatively moving towards 
sustainability, others grappling with the workings 
of a bon usage du néo-authoritarisme, and others 
still entrenching unsustainability through decline 
and conflict. Naturally, polarisation, while being 
the dominant scenario, is not necessarily the only 
one. Different trends could point towards greater 
homogeneity and intra-Mediterranean linkages, be 
this in the direction of a sustainable Euro-Med 
area, or of a divided EU and Mediterranean, in 
which the latter is characterised by unsustainability 
and conflict. Specifically, a growth of Islamist 
parties through electoral processes in countries like 
Tunisia and Egypt, or a greater convergence 
between the EU, the southern Mediterranean with 
Turkey acting as a lynchpin between the two, 
could lead to a greater degree of Mediterranean 
homogeneity. That said, at the time of writing, the 
Arab spring and its evolution predominantly point 
in the direction of greater heterogeneity and 
fragmentation within the southern Mediterranean.  
3. State sustainability in the southern 
Mediterranean: towards what future in 
2030? 
What precise configuration this polarised scenario 
will take and whether the overall balance will tilt 
towards sustainability or not will largely depend on 
the domestic and regional dynamics of the 
Mediterranean. Of great relevance is also the role 
of the EU, and whether EU policies towards the 
region are and will be adequately reshaped to 
effectively support sustainable development on its 
southern shore.  
This leads us to consider the application of these 
results on the partial qualitative scenarios 
elaborated by Carlo Sessa (2011) in the framework 
of the MEDPRO project, to be further revised as 
the project unfolds. These scenarios are reproduced 
in Figure 1 below.  
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Figure 1. MEDPRO Qualitative Scenarios 
EURO-
MEDITERRANEAN AS 
ONE GLOBAL PLAYER
EU-MED Union: common market 
and frameworks of action on key 
topics (e.g. R&D, migrations, trade, 
energy, water); sustainability 
achieved with common 
strategies
EU  AND MED 11 AS
REGIONAL PLAYERS ON 
THE GLOBAL STAGE
Multilateral agreements between the EU 
and MED 11/Arab regions to enhance 
cooperation on key topics; sustainability 
achieved with separate pathways
BAU SCENARIO 
(until 2010)
Continued partial cooperation
through bilateral agreements 
among EU member states 
and MED 11 countries; 
failure to achieve sustainable 
development
THE EURO-
MEDITERRANEAN 
AREA UNDER THREAT
Weakening and failure of 
cooperation schemes; regional 
conflicts in the Mediterranean ; 
sustainability not achieved
I II
IIIIV
Increase of
Total EU‐MED
Wealth
EU‐MED
Community
Euro‐
Mediterranean
Alliance
Decrease of
Total EU‐MED
Wealth
EU-MED COOPERATION
SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT
“GREEN”
TRANSITION
“RED
” 
TRAN
SITIO
N
Success
Success
Failure
Failure
 
Source: Sessa (2011).  
An increasingly heterogeneous Mediterranean 
leading up to 2030, in which some countries fester 
in unsustainability, while others tentatively move 
towards sustainable development, essentially rules 
out quadrants I and II: the ‘BAU’ (business as 
usual) and the ‘Euro-Mediterranean as one global 
player’ scenarios. Both scenarios are premised on a 
degree of homogeneity of the Mediterranean, 
which we are unlikely to see in future. In the first 
BAU scenario, the assumption is that of 
homogenous unsustainability, i.e., the trajectory 
the region was on prior to the Arab spring. The 
revolts in the Arab world have reduced the 
likelihood of this ‘business as usual’ path, 
premised on authoritarian rule, which impeded 
economic growth coupled with the growth of 
manufactured, natural, social and 
political/institutional capital, and on the EU’s 
partial cooperation with the countries of the region. 
However, the revolts, to date, also point to the 
unlikelihood of a homogenous sustainable 
development of the Mediterranean, which, in turn, 
would integrate with the EU forming a single 
Euro-Mediterranean community. The Euro-
Mediterranean community would foresee an 
integration path between the two shores of the 
Mediterranean Sea premised upon the recognition, 
of both sides, of their common past and future. 
Such a community would include a common 
market, similar to that of the European Economic 
Area (EEA). Under this scenario, the current 
conflicts in the southern Mediterranean would be 
settled and all countries, albeit at different speeds, 
would move towards sustainable development, 
supported by EU bilateral policies – namely a 
strengthened ENP – as well as a revamped 
multilateral framework, which successfully 
promotes  regional cooperation within the southern 
Mediterranean. In other words, neither the status 
quo BAU scenario nor the green transition scenario 
appears to be likely today in a 2030 perspective.  
This leaves us with two possible transition paths: 
the red and the blue transitions. A red transition 
foresees a move from unsustainability to 
exacerbated tension and conflict. The unfolding 
situation in Syria, the festering conflict in Israel-
Palestine, as well as the war in Libya, all point in 
this direction. A blue transition instead points 
towards greater overall sustainability within an 
increasingly heterogeneous region. Internal 
Mediterranean heterogeneity would be coupled 
with overall greater sustainability because, inter 
alia, the EU would establish a successful “Euro-
Mediterranean alliance”. Such an alliance would 
support those countries (e.g., Tunisia) which 
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are on the path of sustainable development, 
while nudging other countries (e.g., Morocco and 
Egypt) whose drive for a radical overhaul towards 
sustainability is still unclear. Such an alliance 
would take the form of decentralised but 
interrelated Olympic rings, whereby distinct but 
related regions and sub-regions would all work 
synergetically towards the same aim of 
sustainability within a multipolar world. In other 
words, the EU and the southern Mediterranean 
would remain two distinct regions with no concrete 
prospect of integration into an EEA type 
arrangement. Bilateral EU policies, such as the 
ENP, would shed their ‘enlargement-lite’ 
approach, while multilateral policies, such as the 
UfM, would be revised to account for a more 
heterogeneous southern Mediterranean, which 
would also feature its own forms of multilateral 
cooperation (e.g., the Arab League, the Arab 
Maghreb Union, etc). These two regions would 
enter cooperative contractual relations, featuring 
trade and co-development, political dialogue, 
security, as well as specific initiatives pertaining to 
youth, education, research, innovation and 
infrastructure. However, both regions, while acting 
cooperatively vis-à-vis one another in areas of 
shared interest, would remain autonomous actors 
within a multipolar world.  
The red and blue transitions ought to be interpreted 
as ideal (and non-ideal) types. Reality is likely to 
be fuzzier, including elements of both. More 
precisely, we can imagine that in a 2030 scenario 
the Arab-Israeli and Western Saharan conflicts will 
still be with us. Even in the best of hypotheses, 
whereby the Arab spring presses all (or most) 
countries to embark on a sustainable development 
path, this does not entail a resolution of the 
protracted Arab-Israeli and Western Sahara 
conflicts. This does not mean that the revolts will 
have no repercussions on these conflicts. The 
tentative reconciliation between Hamas and Fateh 
in Palestine is connected to developments in the 
region (particularly in Egypt and Syria). More 
broadly, the overall prospects for war and peace in 
the Middle East will be fundamentally shaped by 
Egypt’s probable resurgence on the regional scene. 
Even if Egypt does not succeed in establishing a 
functioning democracy, the nature of the regime is 
likely to be affected by the Tahrir revolt. In order 
to retain greater popular legitimacy, Egypt’s post-
Tahrir rulers may gradually move away from the 
strategic turn the country had taken after the Camp 
David I accords.5 This had seen on the one hand a 
                                                     
5 Remarks by Roberto Aliboni at an EU4Seas seminar 
held in Torino on 6-7 June 2011.  
loss of leadership in the Arab world and, on the 
other, a heightened strategic dependence on the 
US. The treaty between Egypt and Israel will 
probably remain in force, although Cairo may want 
to renegotiate some of its elements. Nonetheless, 
we are likely to see greater independence in 
Egyptian foreign policy, which would allow Cairo 
to reassert its status in the Arab world. With 
Egypt’s regional resurgence, part of the void that 
had been filled by non-Arab countries like Iran and 
Turkey could be filled. Whether, on a whole, this 
will lead to a more or less conflictual Middle East 
is difficult to tell. But it will probably lead to a 
more multipolar Mediterranean, navigating the 
unchartered waters of a multipolar world.  
4. The EU and the Arab spring: a 
(missed?) opportunity to revamp the 
EU’s Mediterranean policies 
When the dust of the Arab revolts settles, how 
should EU policy towards the southern 
Mediterranean be reframed to support sustainable 
development in the region and thus contribute to 
the blue (and possibly green, as opposed to red) 
scenarios outlined above?  
Most of the thinking around this question has been 
devoted to one of the two pillars of the EU’s 
Mediterranean policies: the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Whereas the ENP 
deals with the bilateral dimension of the EU’s 
Mediterranean policy, that is, the EU’s hub-and-
spoke relations with individual southern 
Mediterranean countries, the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM), building on the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), provides the 
broader multilateral framework of such relations. 
The Arab spring has led, so far, to a rethink of the 
former rather than the latter. Although EU 
documents have made reference to the multilateral 
dimensions of the EU’s policies towards the 
neighbourhood (the Eastern Partnership in the east 
and the UfM in the south), the bulk of attention is 
devoted to the bilateral ENP. 
The rationales underpinning the ENP review 
There are three kinds of rationale underpinning this 
choice. First, a bureaucratic rationale has pressed 
EU institutions to proceed, full speed, with a 
review of the ENP. A review of the ENP has been 
underway since March 2010. Caught off guard by 
the Arab spring, the Union, not known for its 
rapidity of action, was thus fortunate to have been 
already engaged in a major mid-term review of its 
ENP for several months. Indeed, when the revolt 
broke out in Tunisia in December 2010, the 
10 | NATHALIE TOCCI 
 
Commission had just finished compiling the 
contributions of the 27 member states and the 
neighbouring countries, alongside numerous inputs 
from academia and civil society. On the basis of 
such contributions, in October 2010 European 
Commissioner for Enlargement and the ENP 
Stefan Füle (2010) acknowledged that the ENP 
ought to be revised so as to pay greater attention to 
political reform, while being ready to commit to 
deepened political and economic relations with the 
neighbouring countries. The Arab spring made this 
fundamental intuition an all-too evident 
imperative, summed up in what has since then 
become the slogan: “more for more”. 
Second, an internal political-institutional rationale 
has induced the Commission to ‘use’ the Arab 
spring to reassert itself on the throne of the EU’s 
Mediterranean policies. When, under French push, 
the UfM came into being in 2008, the Commission 
bemoaned its sidelining. The Commission, 
alongside Germany and several northern member 
states, fought back, achieving some French 
backtracking. But the unwieldy UfM-EMP never 
fully reversed the French drive for an 
intergovernmentalisation of Euro-Med relations. 
The Arab spring has provided the Commission 
with an opportunity to sideline the UfM, which has 
been delegitimised by its neglect for political 
reform, epitomised by former Egyptian President 
Hosni Mubarak’s role as co-Chair of the UfM 
(alongside French President Nicolas Sarkozy). 
Through its focus on the ENP (of which it is in 
charge), the Commission (and the External Action 
Service) have strived to retake the mantle of the 
EU’s Mediterranean policies.  
Third, an external political rationale has induced a 
focus on the ENP. The revolts in the Arab world 
have demonstrated the weakness of EU policy 
towards the region, particularly of what such 
policy had evolved into in recent years, through its 
lopsided emphasis on economic cooperation and 
migration management at the expense of 
sustainable development. Indeed, the EU had 
increasingly turned a blind eye to the underlying 
fragility of the regimes it cooperated with, 
mistakenly equating their short-term stability with 
their deeper and long-term sustainability, while 
pursuing its interests in the commercial, energy, 
migratory or anti-terrorism domains. As recognised 
by Stefan Füle (2011): 
We must show humility about the past. Europe 
was not vocal enough in defending human 
rights and local democratic forces in the 
region. Too many of us fell prey to the 
assumption that authoritarian regimes were a 
guarantee of stability in the region. This was 
not even Realpolitik. It was, at best, short-
termism – and the kind of short-termism that 
makes the long-term ever more difficult to 
build. 
As stated by High Representative/Vice President 
Catherine Ashton (2011), echoing the very gist of 
this research project, the EU ought to promote 
instead “sustainable stability”, i.e., stability 
achieved through change, rather than immobilism, 
towards sustainable political, social and economic 
development.6 It is essentially through the 
theoretically transformative ENP rather than the 
status quo oriented UfM that the EU has debated 
how to induce sustainable stability in the south. 
The Arab spring has highlighted the need for the 
EU to press more on domestic reform in the south, 
a promise that was made but never kept by the 
ENP (as opposed to the UfM, which never boasted 
a transformative ambition). Alongside this and as 
argued above, the Arab spring is likely to lead to 
greater polarisation and heterogeneity in the south. 
This heterogeneity in the region has strengthened 
the logic of EU bilateralism and differentiation, 
which marks the ENP, while complicating further 
the search for a workable multilateral framework, 
be it the UfM or the EMP before it. In other words, 
both in view of the greater emphasis on domestic 
reform and on differentiation in a post Arab spring 
context, concentrating EU efforts on reviewing the 
ENP appeared the logical route to take.  
The steps forward in the review 
The first outcomes of the ENP review were 
revealed in the Commission’s March 2011 
“Partnership for Democracy and Shared 
Prosperity” (Commission 2011a). These were 
complemented by the Commission’s “New 
Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”, 
disclosed in May 2011 (Commission 2011b). From 
these two Communications, endorsed by the 
Council on 20 June 2011, we can outline a number 
of new or revised positive features of a revamped 
ENP (Tocci & Cassarino, 2011).  
First, the EU recognises the need to offer more 
benefits to the neighbours. Aid in the current 
financial cycle (up to 2013) is expected to rise by 
€1.2bn, to be complemented by an increase of 
€1bn in the European Investment Bank’s loans, as 
well as by a proposed opening of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s 
operations in the Mediterranean for an initial value 
of €1bn. Aid is intended to support economic and 
                                                     
6 C. Ashton, “A world built on cooperation, sovereignty, 
democracy and stability”, speech 11/126 of 25/2/2011. 
STATE (UN)SUSTAINABILITY IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN AND SCENARIOS TO 2030 | 11 
social development, by improving business 
environments, supporting SMEs and microcredit, 
tackling economic disparities, and conducting pilot 
projects on agriculture and rural development. 
Alongside this, political reform is to represent a 
guiding light of the EU’s aid policies. Greater 
resources are to be committed to political reform 
through the Governance Facility, the 
Comprehensive Institution Building (CIBs) 
programme,7 and the new Civil Society Facility 
within the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI). In addition, under 
Polish push, the EU will establish an Endowment 
for Democracy, aimed, inter alia, at political party 
development. More benefits are not limited to aid. 
They also include the offer to the south (as has 
already been done for the east) of “Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements” 
(DCFTAs), which supposedly open the way to 
delivering on the ENP’s unkept promise of a “stake 
in the single market” for the neighbours. More 
benefits also include mobility partnerships and visa 
liberalisation, another benefit that has already been 
contemplated for the east but not, until recently, for 
the south. Mobility partnerships, launched in 2007 
and so far signed only with Cape Verde, Moldova 
and Georgia, foresee the circular migration of 
semi-skilled workers to one or more EU member 
states, in return for the respect by third countries of 
EU conditions related both to domestic reform and, 
above all, to readmission agreements and border 
controls. In return for similar conditions, the EU 
would also offer visa facilitation for students, 
researchers and business people beginning with 
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.  
Second, the EU acknowledges the imperative of 
engaging in conditionality. The “more for more” 
slogan means precisely this: the EU is willing to 
offer more benefits, in return for more progress on 
reform by the neighbours. Specifically, the 
Commission refers to the fact that its aid, including 
both the remaining ENPI funds until 2013 and the 
new funding cycle in 2014 and beyond, will be 
conditioned to the reform performance of the 
neighbours. More reform is interpreted in terms of 
‘deep democracy’, meaning, the kind of democracy 
that lasts because alongside elections, it foresees 
the protection of rights and freedoms, functioning 
institutions, good governance, rule of law, checks 
and balances, the fight against corruption, effective 
law enforcement and security sector reform. 
Reform is also interpreted in economic and social 
                                                     
7 CIBs are aimed at providing technical and financial 
assistance to support the capacity of administrative 
bodies in the neighbourhood.  
terms: promoting inclusive economic development, 
tackling inequalities, creating jobs and ensuring 
higher living standards. The Commission has not 
limited itself to positing the need for positive 
conditionality. It has also accepted that a logical 
corollary of “more for more” is “less for less”: 
negative conditionality. The EU’s recent use of 
restrictive measures towards countries such as 
Syria, Libya and Belarus seem to have induced the 
Commission to shed its instinctive aversion to 
negative conditionality towards (some of) its 
neighbours. 
Third and finally, the Commission stresses the 
need to engage more deeply with the civil societies 
of the neighbourhood supporting their capacities in 
advocacy, monitoring and implementing and 
evaluating EU programmes. Insofar as the 
neighbours are not expected to enter the EU, the 
Union’s demands on them (and thus the degree of 
conditionality towards them) will continue to be 
dampened by the imperative of pursuing 
‘partnerships’ with these countries. Yet the 
Commission now recognises that the notion of 
partnership ought not to be interpreted exclusively 
in relation to authoritarian regimes, but also to civil 
societies in third countries. Hence, the EU 
proposes to provide both greater financial support 
for civil society, and to engage in deepened and 
more structured dialogue with civil society actors, 
both in Brussels and on the ground, through EU 
delegations in the neighbourhood.   
The limits  
More benefits, more conditionality and more 
partnership with civil society is good news. It is 
certainly a step forward in tailoring the EU’s 
policies towards the southern Mediterranean to the 
promotion of sustainable development. But 
alongside these pluses are a number of minuses, 
which, alas, can only be expected to increase as the 
ENP review translates from paper into practice 
(Tocci & Cassarino, 2011). 
First, the ENP remains trapped in the logic of 
enlargement and of security, hindering the actual 
value of the benefits on offer. The Commission has 
proposed DCFTAs to the neighbours. Working 
towards and then implementing DCFTAs entail the 
harmonisation of trade standards and practices with 
those of the EU. Such harmonisation is a heavy 
price to pay for the eastern neighbours, with only a 
slim chance of EU membership. It is simply not 
worth the bargain for the southern neighbours, 
which have neither the prospect nor the desire of 
entering the EU. Rather than DCFTAs, premised 
on the logic of enlargement, the EU ought to 
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seriously consider liberalising its markets, 
particularly in the realm of agriculture,8 without 
demanding compliance with the highly regulated 
features of the single market, if it is truly willing to 
put more appetising carrots on the table. Likewise, 
the EU has proposed mobility partnerships as a 
valuable offer to the neighbours. Yet the logic of 
mobility partnerships remains highly security 
driven and its overall value questionable. The 
neighbours are offered limited mobility9 only if 
they comply with a host of strict security 
requirements regarding readmission and border 
controls. On the one hand, as and when the third 
countries acquire the capability to enforce such 
requirements, their level of internal development 
and stability is often such that their potential for 
emigration has been largely depleted.10 On the 
other hand, the cost of implementing the EU’s 
requirements is such that the reward of temporary 
mobility for a limited category of citizens is often 
not worth the bargain. This is all the more true in a 
country like Tunisia, which may be tentatively 
moving towards greater sustainability and 
therefore in which authorities will become more 
accountable to citizens and less willing to play 
along with the EU’s securitised migration policy 
tune. 
Second, the ENP remains trapped in the logic of 
vagueness, hindering the prospects of effective 
conditionality. While asserting the principles of 
conditionality and “more for more”, very little 
guidance has been provided regarding how to 
make these notions operational. True, the 
Commission has referred to the need for a smaller 
number of more focused reform priorities and for 
more precise benchmarks and a clear sequencing 
of actions. But few indications are provided as to 
how this would be done. How precisely is the EU 
to benchmark and monitor its conditions? How 
will new instruments such as the Endowment for 
Democracy provide added value rather than 
duplicate existing EU instruments such as the 
Governance Facility and the European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights? How will the 
new Endowment work synergetically with 
                                                     
8 Southern Mediterranean countries face tariff quotas on 
60 basic agricultural products including fruit and 
vegetables. See Booth, Scarpetta & Swidlicki (2011). 
9 It should be noted that the bulk of circular migration 
takes place spontaneously and not through regulated 
schemes of mobility partnerships. Remarks by Anna 
Triandafyllidou, European University Institute, 22 June 
2011.  
10 Remarks by Anna Triandafyllidou, European 
University Institute, 22 June 2011.  
established non-state actors in the field, such as the 
German political foundations or the American 
National Democratic Institute and International 
Republican Institute? Precious little guidance is 
provided to answer these crucial questions.   
Third, the EU remains trapped in a logic of 
insularity, making its new-found emphasis on civil 
society welcome but insufficient. Gone are the 
days of the Barcelona Process, in which the EU 
acted in the hope (or illusion) of creating a 
common Euro-Med home. Not only are both the 
EU and the southern Mediterranean countries more 
divided than in the 1990s, but the region is 
permeated by the presence of new (and old) 
external actors, which the EU cannot ignore. These 
include both traditional allies, such as the US, as 
well as other regional – Turkey and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council – and global – China – actors, 
which are increasingly active in the Mediterranean. 
The EU, in its ENP review, continues to think it 
acts in a vacuum, failing to seize the synergies and 
contrast the eventual counter moves of the multiple 
set of actors involved in the region.  
Finally, the review of the EU’s Mediterranean 
policies focuses predominantly on the bilateral 
ENP rather than the multilateral UfM. As argued 
above, the internal bureaucratic and institutional-
political logic of why this is the case is clear. 
Equally clear is the strong external logic 
underpinning the ENP’s review, which points to 
the heart of this project’s conclusions: a) that the 
EU ought to focus more on the sustainable 
development of Mediterranean countries and b) 
that the region is likely to be marked by greater 
polarisation. The bilateral and transformative 
nature of the ENP responds to both these realities.  
In the case of the green transition path, the ENP 
would retain a focus on European integration. In 
the case of the (more likely) blue transition path, it 
would need to be revised by shedding its 
enlargement-lite identity. In both cases however, 
the ENP would be aimed at supporting the 
domestic transformation of the southern 
Mediterranean countries towards sustainable 
development.  
This, however, leaves unresolved what to do about 
the multilateral dimension of the EU’s 
Mediterranean policies. Whereas the bulk of the 
EU’s transformative agenda can and should be 
tackled through the EU’s bilateral relations with 
individual countries and, in the event of the green 
transition path, the ENP would remain the 
dominant policy framework, there remain a 
number of key policy questions, ranging from 
infrastructure and communications to non-
proliferation, combating organised crime and 
STATE (UN)SUSTAINABILITY IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN AND SCENARIOS TO 2030 | 13 
maritime security, which continue to warrant 
multilateral solutions. Such a multilateral 
framework becomes all the more important in the 
event of the blue transition path, which foresees 
region-to-region relations between the EU and the 
southern Mediterranean. The question still pending 
is thus what is the appropriate multilateral 
framework to tackle such questions? The increased 
degree of heterogeneity of the region suggests that 
a working multilateral framework should probably 
not be as rigid and institutionalised as the EMP, 
and, more so, the UfM. Rigidity and 
institutionalisation have been a recipe for deadlock 
in Mediterranean multilateralism and are likely to 
be even more so in future. A pragmatic, ad hoc and 
probably more sub-regional approach (e.g., 
building on existing sub-regional groupings such 
as the 5 + 5, the Western Mediterranean and the 
Arab League) to EU multilateral policies would 
thus seem a more appropriate approach to dealing 
with regional problems in a post-Arab spring 
Mediterranean.11 A grand multilateral strategy for 
the Mediterranean may hinder rather than help the 
search for solutions to the region’s multilateral 
problems.  
5. Conclusions  
In a 2030 perspective, the Mediterranean is likely 
to be increasingly polarised and heterogeneous. 
This rules out a scenario of homogenous 
Mediterranean unsustainability (BAU scenario) as 
well as a green transition towards homogenous 
Euro-Med sustainability. This leaves us with the 
two logical alternatives of a red transition towards 
heightened conflict and a blue transition towards 
an overall more sustainable yet multipolar 
Mediterranean region in alliance (but not 
integration) with the EU. Reality is likely to 
feature elements of both these scenarios. The 
policy question at hand is how the EU could tilt the 
balance towards the blue and away from the red 
transition paths.  
In order to do so and thus to contribute to 
sustainable development in the Mediterranean, the 
EU has engaged in a review of its policies towards 
the region, focusing on the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. As analysed above, there 
are important elements in this review that represent 
a step forward compared to EU policy over the 
past decade(s). Yet, in light of the momentous 
developments unfolding in the region, the current 
review runs the risk of being too little too late. By 
                                                     
11 Remarks made by Eduard Soler y Lecha and Jordi 
Vaquer y Fanes at an EU4Seas seminar held in Torino 
6-7 June 2011.  
failing to offer sufficiently valuable benefits, to 
engage in meaningful conditionality, to account for 
the multipolar reality of the region (and of the 
world), and to appropriately revise the broader 
multilateral framework of its policies, the EU risks 
falling behind the curve of events. This would 
increase the likelihood of the Mediterranean tilting 
towards the red transition path, which would, in 
turn, harden EU tendencies to conceptualise the 
Mediterranean Sea as a hard frontier rather than a 
soft and open borderland. Avoiding this scenario 
calls for the EU to rapidly conjure up the will and 
vision to overcome its political and institutional 
inertia, addressing the above-mentioned limits in 
its review and thus developing a truly valuable and 
credible Mediterranean policy pursued alongside 
other state and non-state actors at both regional and 
global level.  
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Annex 1. State (un)Sustainabilty: Overview of MEDPRO Countries 
MEDPRO 
Countries 
Factors of unsustainability 
Domestic and external factors that interact to 
produce unsustainability in the long term 
(2030 perspective) 
Conditions for sustainability 
Key conditions to achieve 
long-term sustainability 
Relevant signals 
Positive, negative and uncertain signals, 
that while interacting, will materialise in 
a certain future (up to July 2011) 
Updated scenarios for each 
country 
The view of current signals will lead 
to a certain long-term outcome 
Morocco  Macro-economic reforms and large 
infrastructure and transport projects not matched 
by an improvement in social standards 
Major shortcomings in the education sector and 
in the judiciary 
Widespread and continued corruption 
Non-respect of freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press 
Fake political liberalisation (co-optation of 
political parties, political system centred on the 
King) 
Increased frustration with the ability of the 
political system to deliver socially and 
economically 
Deadlock in the Western Sahara conflict and its 
impact on regional cooperation and integration 
Support of piecemeal reforms by the EU 
Committing to  the democratic 
transition process 
New constitution voted in a 
referendum as a move towards 
a constitutional monarchy  
Resolution of the Western 
Sahara conflict  
Greater conditionality applied 
by the EU 
Decreasing freedom of expression (-) 
Increasing poverty and inequality (-) 
Upcoming parliamentary elections 
(uncertain)  
Return to politics by Moroccans after 
many years of disengagement (+) 
Vibrant and active civil society (+) 
Continuing protests by the February 20 
movement (uncertain)  
Occasional violent repression of the 
protests (-)  
Membership of Morocco in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (uncertain) 
Top-down transition with some 
room for manoeuvre for other socio-
political actors 
Risk of going back to bon usage du 
néo-authoritarisme 
Tunisia  Failure to write a deep and widely approved 
constitutional reform 
Non-accountability of the parliament 
Fragile security 
Persistent regional disparities and youth 
unemployment  
Predominant role of Islamist parties with no 
checks and balances/ cutting off official political 
avenues to moderate Islamists with the risk of 
radicalisation 
Increased frustration with post-revolutionary 
expectations, particularly among the youth 
(rising social tensions, radicalisation and so on) 
Transparent and inclusive 
elections 
Profound reform of the 
constitution preserving laicism 
and women’s rights 
Dynamic and vigilant civil 
society 
Profound restructuring of the 
political economy 
Deep reforms of the security 
and justice sectors  
Economic reforms that ensure 
inclusion and sustainability  
Election of the Constituent 
Assembly/decision to postpone its 
election (uncertain)  
Interim period managed by civilian 
authorities through inclusive decision-
making process (+) 
Apparently inclusive electoral law (+) 
More economic policy focus on regional 
disparities (+) 
Fragile security (-) 
Disappointment of people, unhappy with 
the limited speed of democratic reforms (-
) 
Non-involvement of the army so far (+) 
 
Promising prospects for successful 
political transition, but taking a long 
time and being at risk of 
authoritarian involution 
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Egypt Non-inclusiveness of the process of 
constitutional reform/ new constitution 
reflecting the influence of the old system of 
power 
Unaccountability of representative institutions  
Incapacity to deal with past and current socio-
economic problems 
Lack of security and rule of law 
Tense inter-religious relations 
Dominant role of political Islam, with no checks 
and balances/no inclusion of moderate Islamist 
parties 
Increased frustration with post-revolutionary 
expectations 
Transparent and inclusive 
elections 
Reform of the constitution, 
guaranteeing minority and 
women’s rights  
Dynamic and well-organised 
civil society  
Deep reforms of the justice and 
security sectors 
Profound restructuring of the 
political economy 
Interim period managed by the Military 
Council through a top-down approach 
(uncertain)  
Holding upcoming parliamentary 
elections under the old, albeit amended 
constitution (uncertain)  
Continuing insecurity (-) 
Persistent protests and labour strikes (-)  
Intransigent response to dissent (-)  
Weaknesses of new political and civil 
society groups (-) 
Episodes of religious intolerance and 
sectarians tensions (-) 
The Muslim Brotherhood and other 
Islamist forces supporting 
slow/conservative transition (uncertain)   
No change in the direction of economic 
policy and no fight against corruption (-)  
Egypt’s turning down the generous 
package offered by the IMF and the WB 
in favour of aid from other Arab 
countries, e.g., Saudi Arabia (uncertain)  
Authoritarian involution  
Limited, unfinished or slow political 
transformation 
Lebanon Clientelistic nature of the political system 
Syrian influence over Lebanon 
Resilience of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
Looming crisis over the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon indictment 
Maintaining the country open  
to external investors 
Maintaining macro-economic 
stability 
Strengthening the 
accountability of the elected 
institutions 
Reducing the level of sectarian 
conflict 
Ensuring security 
Continuing Shia-Sunni conflict (-) 
Increasing sectarian conflicts in other 
countries of the region (e.g., Syria, 
Bahrain) 
(-) 
Weakness of state institutions (-) 
Widespread corruption (-) 
Paralysis of the state (-) 
Vibrant civil society (+) 
Chronic instability and intermittent 
crisis 
Short-term stability without 
sustainability  
Israel  No conflict resolution 
Worsening of citizens’ rights (Arab minority) 
Deferment of key political issues related to the 
conflict 
Worsening of legislation in terms of social and 
economic rights 
End of settlement and 
acceptance of the two-state 
solution  
Increasing cooperation with 
other states in the region 
Decline in citizens’ rights (Arab minority) 
(-) 
No decision-making process for conflict 
resolution (-) 
US entrenched support for Israel 
hampering resolution of the conflict (-) 
Status quo leaning towards 
unsustainability  
Risk of regional isolation  
Weak stability 
Probable rising tensions with 
neighbouring countries 
Palestine Aid-driven economic growth (West Bank only) Agreement between Fatah and Call for UN recognition (uncertain) Status quo as unsustainable strategy 
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Authority No conflict resolution 
Division between West Bank/Gaza Strip 
Absence of a shared and legitimate political 
governance 
Increase of centralised decision-making process 
and authoritarian features 
Lack of true legislative process 
Speculative bubble 
Hamas 
Implementation of the two-
state solution  
Popular pressure on the leadership 
(uncertain) 
US opposition to any UN recognition of a 
Palestinian state (-) 
for the leadership  
Weak stability 
Conflict persistence 
Internal turmoil toward 
unsustainability 
Syria  Political repression and lack of individual 
freedoms 
Emphasis on security at expense of political 
opening 
Widespread corruption 
Limited economic growth 
 Ending violence against the 
population and re-establishing 
order 
Re-structuring of the political 
system with new parties and 
intermediate organisations 
Holding free and fair elections 
Growing gap between the regime and the 
population (-) 
Role of the security forces in buttressing 
al-Assad’s regime (-) 
Thousands of Syrian refugees crossing 
the border with Turkey (-) 
Limited role of the US, EU and Turkey in 
the conflict (uncertain) 
Opposition gathering against the regime 
in Turkey (+) 
Long-term unsustainability 
Risk of further destabilisation for the 
entire Middle Eastern region 
Libya Lack of transparency, inclusiveness and 
legitimacy of the NTC 
Persistent factionalism and rivalry between NTC 
leaders and militia commanders 
Lack of state institutions aimed at fostering 
inclusive national identity 
Lack of centralised security apparatus and 
inability of government to secure Libya’s 
borders 
Tentative signs of emerging secessionist 
movements 
Lack of organised civil society organisations 
 
Necessity to enhance NTC’s 
popular legitimacy through 
elections to the council 
Commitment to transparent 
and inclusive national elections 
Inclusive process of reforming 
constitution, creating a modern 
legal system and state 
institutions 
Efforts to diminish regional 
inequalities and to reform the 
economy 
Necessity to integrate militias 
into police force and army 
Commitment to agreed transition 
timetable, albeit with some delays in 
preparations for elections (uncertain) 
Lack of security and the persistence of 
infighting and armed clashes (-) 
Troubles with disarming of militias and 
their integration into national police force 
and army (-) 
Persistence of NTC’s lack of legitimacy, 
transparency and dialogue with all parties 
(-) 
NTC’s commitment to elections and 
transition of power (+) 
Persistence of widespread corruption by 
national and regional authorities (-) 
Lack of legitimacy, factionalism and 
long waiting period for general 
elections could cause tension and a 
possible risk of authoritarian 
involution   
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Algeria Lack of diversification of the economy 
Rising unemployment, housing crisis, socio-
economic inequalities and regional disparities 
Dominance of executive over legislative 
branches of government with lack of checks and 
balances (or oversight) 
Persistence of terrorism threat  
Lack of civilian oversight on intelligence 
services and military 
Resumption of Algeria’s 
interrupted process of 
democratic reform 
Apparent commitment to 
announced constitutional 
amendments, liberalisation of 
audio-visual sector and 
changes to the legislation 
concerning the legalisation of 
political parties and civil 
society groups 
Diversification of economy 
and diminishing of regional 
inequalities 
Top-down, regime-led, approach to 
political reforms (-) 
Growing legitimacy crisis of government 
and political institutions (-)  
Popular disillusionment with promised 
political reforms (-) 
Continued repression of civil society and 
opposition groups and persistence of laws 
aimed at curbing public gatherings in the 
capital even after lifting of emergency 
laws (-) 
Implemented reforms in the audio-visual 
service sector (uncertain)  
Growing demands for political, economic 
and social reforms by members close to 
governing elite (+) 
Attempts to form coalitions among civil 
society organisations in country and 
attempts to contact external actors (i.e. 
EU) to put pressure on government (+)    
Growing acceptance by government of 
the necessity for political and economic 
reform (uncertain) 
Persistent uncertainty concerning 
extent and reach of promised 
government reforms 
Three legalisd Islamist parties unite 
in run-up to legislative elections 
planned for May 2012 
Major centre-left party, the Socialist 
Forces Front (FFS), has announced it 
will run in elections (it had 
boycotted them in the past)   
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